ON THE FUNCTIONS AND GRAMMATICAL STATUS OF THE
LATVIAN MODAL PARTICLE lai

1. The problem stated: lai and the paradigm of the imperative

Latvian grammars mention the particle lai only as an inflectional element contained in what is considered to be the analytic form of the imperative for the 3rd person and sometimes also for the 1st person plural (cf. E n d z e l i n s, 1951, 892 as well as B e r g m a n e e. a., 1959, 801, where lai is called a formveidojoša partikula).

(1) Lai viņi tūlīt nāk laukā!
    ‘Let them come outside at once!’

(2) Lai neaizmirstam, ka direkcijai tiesība uzņemt jaunus biedrus. (A. Deglavs)
    ‘Let us not forget that the board have the right to admit new members’.

The grammars do not specify whether every combination of lai with a 3rd person present indicative is to be considered an analytic imperative. The LLVV mentions this use as one among many others: lai as a component of the analytic imperative is distinguished from the particle lai in optative (vēlējuma nozīme) and hortative (pamudinājuma nozīme) meaning. Among optative uses one instance with a verb form in the conditional mood is cited:

(3) Lai viiss sils izdegtu! (R. Blaumanis)
    ‘Would that the whole wood were consumed by fire!’

If we consider forms like lai nāk, lai (ne)aizmirstam to be analytic forms of the imperative, then the forms nāk, aizmirstam cannot be considered indicatives in those cases where they occur together with the particle lai: inasmuch as imperative meaning is here conveyed by lai, the verb forms would by themselves be unmarked in terms of mood. We would therefore not expect lai to combine with more than one verbal mood, so that the status of analytic imperatives cannot be ascribed to combinations of lai with the conditional. As I will try to demonstrate below, the use of the indicative and the conditional with lai corresponds to a semantic distinction which can also be found in other instances of opposition between indicative and conditional.

Furthermore, lai also co-occurs with the relative (oblique, indirect) mood in free indirect discourse, as a substitute for the imperative which would be used in direct speech. This is illustrated by (4):
Ienāca Lapsu Frīda. Lai aizdodot sērkociņus, neesot neviena mājas un nevarot uguni aizdegt. (P. Rozītis)

‘L. F. came in. (She asked if) they (could) lend her some matches. There was nobody at home (she said) and she couldn’t light a fire.’

This fact constitutes less conclusive evidence against the use of lai as a marker of mood than the above-mentioned combinations of lai with the conditional. The reason is that, at least in some varieties of Latvian, the markers of the relative mood can be combined with those of other moods as well. In several dialects, the relative mood can be formed from the conditional, as in viņas būtuot pārverētušās ‘(it is reported that) they would have been transformed’ (Endzelīns, 1951, 981-2). Though this is not a feature of the standard language, it may not be disregarded in a discussion on the relationship between evidential and mood in Latvian. Evidentiality and mood are often described as distinct categories (cf. Jacobsen, 1957, 4), and one is therefore not surprised to find this confirmed in Latvian by the co-occurrence of evidential and modal markers.

The co-occurrence of lai and the markers of the relative mood must cause some difficulties to a description where both are taken to represent distinct moods, as is the case in the Academy Grammar (cf. Bergman e.a., 1959, 624-627 for the relative mood; in this respect the Academy Grammar continues a tradition established by Endzelīns, cf. Endzelīns, 1951, 976–7). However, the authors of the Academy Grammar do not see this as a problem: they simply introduce an ‘imperatival variety’ of the relative mood (Bergman e.a., 1959, 626; 1962, 168). This solution is similar to that proposed for the debitive, which is also described as a mood though its markers combine with those of other moods, so that it becomes necessary to distinguish a conditional and a relative variety within the ‘deitive mood’ (Bergman e.a., 1959, 616). Of course, this is only an makeshift solution. The Academy Grammar describes the relative mood as a form conveying uncertified information (‘verbs atstāstijuma izteiksmē izsaka darbību, par kuras realitāti runātājs neatbild’, Bergman e.a., 1959, 624), a definition obviously designed to justify the inclusion of this form in the category of mood. The use of the relative mood in quotative function is mentioned in the second place, as a corollary of the general definition.

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1 In Lithuanian the situation of the relative mood is basically the same as in Latvian, but there seems to be no overlap of evidential and modal markers. The status of the ‘oblique’ forms is an object of dispute in Lithuanian grammar: the new Academy Grammar (Ambrazas, ed., 1994, 310, 345) unquestioningly describes them as a mood, but cf. also, for instance, Jakaitienė, Laigoniai, Paulauskienė 1976, 148-9.

2 Actually some of the examples cited there involve complement clauses with verba postulandi, where lai is simply a complementiser, so that there is no motivation at all for distinguishing an imperatival variety within the relative mood. The only relevant examples are instances of free indirect speech.
(‘Atstāstijuma izteiksmi lieto tād., kad runātājs atstāsta citu teikto, no citiem dzirdēto’). In fact, if the meaning of the relative mood is assumed to be connected with epistemic modality (as the above-mentioned definition suggests), then the existence of an imperatival variety within the relative mood must appear rather surprising. On the other hand, if the relative mood is really a quotative form, then its function is not at all incompatible with that of the imperative. But then it also becomes clear that the relative forms are independent of mood and belong to another domain altogether.

It was mentioned above that the status of analytic imperative forms can be ascribed to combinations of *lai* with the indicative only. Within this group of uses, one would expect tense oppositions to be neutralised, as the imperative is typically tenseless (the conditional with *lai* may occur both in its simple and its compound variety). On the whole, the facts do not contradict this, as the present is practically the only form of the indicative to be used with *lai*. However, some restricted tense variation is possible, e.g., a preterite is sometimes found in narrative texts, in free indirect discourse:

(5) **Jeb vai lai viņš Andriksonam piedeva un piekodināja klusu ciest?**
    (Blaumanis)
    ‘Or was he to forgive Andrikson and to order him to remain silent?’

In the *Academy Grammar*, the status of analytic imperative forms is ascribed only to combinations of *lai* with verb forms of the 3rd person as well as of the 1st person singular. This seems to result not so much from actually observable restrictions in the distribution of *lai* as from an a priori conception of the inventory of forms which the paradigm of the imperative may be expected to comprise. In several languages this paradigm comprises 3rd person forms, many languages (e.g., Lithuanian, several Slavonic languages) also have a special form for the 1st person plural, but a 1st person singular is probably rare. Semantic considerations may also be involved: a characteristic feature of the imperative is that its use reflects an act of volition on the part of the speaker. In Latvian, it is easy enough to find the particle *lai* used with 1st person singular forms, but these uses conspicuously differ from imperatives in that they reflect an act of volition on the part of some other person than the speaker.

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3 This term has been used to refer to a form denoting ‘what has been said to be true’ (Palmer 1986, 71ff.), a definition which, again, suggests a close connection with modality. However, the function of the Latvian relative mood is not to qualify an assertion: it is used to transmit questions and commands as well as assertions. Quotative marking is obviously superimposed onto modal marking.

4 The uses of (apparent) preterites with *lai* in the language of the folks songs (Endzelins 1951, 893) is not taken into consideration here.
2. Deontic requests

1st person forms with *lai* often occur in what has been referred to as ‘deontic requests’ (Palmer, 1986, 106). These are questions in which the speaker asks how the person the question is addressed to wants him to behave in a particular situation, or, alternatively, how he should behave according to some general rules of conduct.

(6) **Ko lai es daru?**

‘What should I do/What am I to do/What do you want me to do?’

Deontic requests differ from other questions in that they are requests for directives rather than for information. The modal meaning of *lai* is not fundamentally different from what it is in those cases where it is described as an imperative marker, only the role pattern is inverted: here the speaker is the potential agent, whereas his behaviour is made to depend on an act of volition on the part of some other person or on a collective act of volition reflected in some code of behaviour.

It should be mentioned that in many languages deontic requests contain modal verbs comparable to English *should*, but if a language has some special mood (subjunctive, optative) to express deontic meaning, it may also use it in deontic requests, cf. the subjunctive in Latin *Quid agam?* ‘What am I to do?’, *Quid agerem?* ‘What was I to do?’ (Palmer, 1986, 106).

Deontic requests may frequently refer to some situation in the past, and in that case they will characteristically carry counterfactual implications, as the speaker assumes that the course of action ensuing from the directives of the person(s) whose opinion or code of behaviour he is invoking would have differed from the one actually taken. As Palmer (1986, 101) writes, deontic predicates used with reference to the past contain a conditional element: expressions of the type ‘you should have done this or that’ refer to what would have occurred if the subject had conformed to some code of behaviour imposed upon him. This holds true for deontic requests as well. In Latvian, deontic requests referring to the past are characterised by the use of the past conditional with the particle *lai*:

(7) **Nu ko tad lai es būtu darījusi? (P. Rozītis)**

‘But what, then, was I to do?’, ‘What should I have done then?’

The past conditional used here is opposed to the present indicative used in deontic requests referring to the present or future. In both cases, the deontic predicate is expressed by the particle *lai*; what is conveyed by the conditional mood is the counterfactual element characterising this type of deontic requests. The functional opposition between indicative and conditional mood which we observe here does not differ in any way from what can be observed in conditional periods, where the distinction is traditionally described as one between *realtis* and *irrealtis*. In other words,
there can be no question of the opposition between both moods being neutralised in combination with the particle *lai*, at least in deontic requests. As to the uses described as instances of an analytic imperative (as illustrated in (1-2)), they will, of course, be non-factive rather than counterfactive. One would therefore not expect the conditional mood to be used here, and indeed it is not observed at all.

3. Evaluative uses

Apart from deontic requests, the use of *lai* can also be observed in evaluative contexts. The object of evaluation is an act of volition or a code of behaviour with which the speaker disagrees. Quite frequently, this use of *lai* can be observed in rhetorical questions: rather than asking for directives, the speaker states his indignation at some demand made on him or some other person:

(8) Es lai aiztieku kunga mantu? (A. Brigadere)
   ‘How could I make free with my master’s property?’

It is a matter of mere convention whether a question mark or an exclamation mark is written at the end of a sentence like (8). Of course, there is no neat line of division between deontic requests proper and the evaluative uses of *lai* just described: *Vai lai es to daru* may mean both ‘Should I do this?’ and ‘How could I possibly do a thing like this?’. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that we are dealing with two distinct types of uses. Whereas the properly deontic use of *lai* reflecting an act of volition on the part of some other person than the speaker is possible only in questions (in an affirmative sentence *Lai es to būtu darījis* ‘I should have done this’ would be ungrammatical), the evaluative use may frequently be observed in affirmative sentences. Moreover, it is interesting to note that clauses containing the particle *lai*, used in contexts where an act of volition is being evaluated, behave as if they were not just formally affirmative, but assertive as well, as if the act of volition which is being evaluated were not merely presupposed, but asserted. Of course, the assertive value of these clauses is problematic. There is always the pragmatic presupposition, based on some previous utterance, that some unreasonable act of volition is being evaluated, and its author should be identifiable from the context as well. Cf. (9):

(9) Mēs [...] cināmies visu ko panākt no acumirkļa. Ko mēs gribam, tas lai
    notiktu uz vietās. (A. Brigadere)
   ‘We strive to obtain everything we can from the present moment. What
    ever we want should happen (i.e., we expect it to happen) at once’.

Sometimes a rule of behaviour or moral principle laid down by some person other than the speaker, and negatively evaluated by the speaker himself, is explicitly described by means of a *verbum sentiendi*, and the clause with *lai* then occurs as a sub-
ordinate clause introduced by the conjunction *ka* ‘that’, as illustrated in (10). This is, of course, a syntactic context normally characterised by assertive modality:

(10) Vai jūs domājat, ka viņš lai uzaug kā suns, visu aizmirsts un pamests?
(P. Rozītis)
‘Do you think [it is right] that he should grow up like a dog, forgotten and abandoned by everyone?’

The evaluative element which can be observed in sentences like (8-10) is, of course, added to the basic deontic meaning of *lai*. What is evaluated by the speaker is always an obligation imposed on someone (usually the speaker himself) by some individual or by some collective code of behaviour. There are cases, however, where the function of *lai* appears to belong to the domain of epistemic modality. *Lai* may express negative evaluation of an opinion expressed by (or ascribed to) some other person rather than of an act of volition:

(11) Viņš lai būtu palīdzējis slepkavam! (A. Bels)
‘How could he be supposed to have helped a murderer?’

(12) Kāpēc lai viņiem rastos aizdomas? (A. Eglītis)
‘Why should they become suspicious?’

However, the fact that *lai* can be used to evaluate not only acts of volition, but assertions as well, does not mean that its function is epistemic. Volitive expressions are used to refer to the utterance of assertions in other languages as well. German, for instance, sometimes uses *wollen* in this meaning: *er will dich gestern gesehen haben*, lit. ‘he wants to have seen you yesterday’, means ‘he affirms he saw you yesterday’. Evidently this way of describing an assertion as if it reflected an act of volition is a strategy used in order to manifest one’s disagreement with it: the author of a statement is depicted as perversely *willing* things to be otherwise than the speaker thinks them to be.

4. The grammatical properties of *lai*: mood and word order

As far as the use of the moods is concerned, we see that in those uses described here as evaluative, *lai* may combine both with the indicative (as in (8), (10)) and in the conditional (as in (9)). The principles underlying the distribution of these moods are not as transparent as in the case of deontic requests. In case of reference to some moment in the past, a compound conditional will be used to the exclusion of the indicative, and this can, of course, be associated with counterfactivity. The uses illustrated in (8-10), however, are non-factual. Here the use of the conditional is probably associated with a stronger rejection of the very possibility of the event actually occurring. In this respect, there is a difference between non-factual deontic requests and
non-factive evaluative uses of *lai*: in the former, the present indicative is always used, whereas in evaluative contexts the present conditional is frequent. There is thus an opposition between the deontic request *Vai lai es viņam palīdzzi*? ‘Should I help him?’ and the evaluative *Es lai viņam palīdzēzi*? ‘How could I be expected to help him?’.

Between the several types of uses described above (imperatival uses, deontic requests, evaluative contexts) it is also possible to observe certain differences with respect to the place of the particle *lai* within the clause. In those cases where *lai*, used with the present indicative, is described as a kind of analytic imperative, it usually occurs at the opening of the clause, or, at any rate (as noted in the Academy Grammar, cf. B e r g m a n e e. a., 1959, 626, albeit only for combinations of *lai* with the relative mood) it is separated from the verb form by the subject:

(13) Lai Kadiķis tad dzīvo ar viltnieci Ritu! (P. Rozītis)
‘Let Kadiķis live with that treacherous Rita, then.’

On the other hand, in evaluative contexts there appears to be a strong tendency to put *lai* immediately before the verb form, as can clearly be seen in (8-10), where *lai* occurs between the subject and the verb form. As noted above, the inverse order (*lai* + subject + verb form) is characteristic of the imperatival uses.

Deontic requests seem to occupy an intermediate position between these two types as far as word order is concerned. One finds instances where *lai* occurs at the beginning of the clause, as in the imperatival uses, but one also finds it positioned immediately before the verb, as in evaluative uses. Compare (14) on the one hand and (15) on the other:

(14) Bet kā *lai* es te visu ziemu *nodziuvoju*, ja uz mani tā skatāties? (P. Rozītis)
‘But how am I to spend the whole winter here, if that’s the way you look at me?’

(15) Ko viņa citu gan *lai buītu darījusi* visu garu vasaru? (P. Rozītis)
‘What else should she have done all this long summer?’

5. One single *lai* or two homonyms?

We can now proceed to discuss the question whether there is one single particle *lai* or whether two distinct linguistic units are involved, one of them a modal particle, the other a part of the analytic forms of the imperative. The latter is suggested by the differences which can be observed between two more or less distinct uses of *lai*. Those uses of *lai* which have been referred to as instances of analytic forms of the imperative are characterised by the following features:

(a) *lai* tends to occur clause-initially, and

(b) it combines with the indicative only, not with the conditional.
On the other hand, the use of *lai* in deontic requests and in evaluative contexts is characterised by the following features:

(a) *lai* tends to be placed immediately before the verb form (especially in evaluative use, less consistently in deontic requests), and

(b) it combines both with the indicative and the conditional.

In principle, it would thus be possible to single out one *lai* which, when combined with some forms of the present indicative, would constitute a kind of analytic imperative. It would be distinguished from the homonymous modal particle *lai* by distributional features comprising word order and co-occurrence with mood forms.

However, the features of this *lai* with respect to word order are rather puzzling. Why should *lai*, being part of an analytic verb form, be put at the opening of the clause and not in the immediate neighbourhood of the verb, as this is observed when *lai* occurs in deontic requests or evaluative contexts? Should one not rather expect the opposite? On the one hand, there seems to be a general tendency to put auxiliaries immediately before the main verb form or close to it (unless this principle is overridden by some general law of word order, as in German), and we may expect particles performing a function comparable to that of auxiliaries to behave in a similar way. On the other hand, it seems that modal particles modifying a whole clause as such tend to occupy the same position as conjunctions, i.e., tend to occur clause-initially. A volitive particle like *kaut* ‘would that...’ (described as a modal particle in Bergman et al., 1959, 797, unlike *lai*, which is treated as a formveidojoša partikula) is normally put at the opening of a clause, as shown by the following examples from the LLVV (Vol. 4, s.v. *kaut*):

(16) Kaut jel māz mākonītis aizstiepies saulei priekšā! (A. Niedre)
(17) Kaut tikai Inga izveseļotos, kaut māte neraudātu. (A. Dripe)

It seems difficult to explain why the tendency to put *lai* immediately before the verb form should be observed in those cases where it is not combined with it into an analytic form.

With regard to mood, the facts might seem, at first glance, to be in favour of a separate treatment of two uses of *lai*. In those cases which the authors of the Academic Grammar would qualify as instances of analytic imperatives, it is probably impossible to substitute the conditional for the indicative, whereas in deontic requests the conditional is often used, and in evaluative contexts it clearly predominates. Nevertheless, this line of division is not a neat one. As mentioned above, the opposition between indicative and conditional in deontic requests with the particle *lai* reflects that between non-factive and counterfactive meaning. By their very nature, imperatives are always non-factive, so that one is not surprised to find the indicative consistently used here. Thus, with regard to mood there is no clear-cut line
of division between the use of *lai* in what is described as analytic imperatives on the one hand and in non-factive deontic requests on the other.

What we observe is thus rather a continuum than a sharp line of division between several clearly distinct types of uses. Both with regard to word order and to mood deontic requests seem to occupy an intermediary position between the imperatival and the evaluative uses. Correspondingly, there seems to be a continuum rather than a sharp line of division between the different types of grammatical behaviour on which our definition of the grammatical status of *lai* could be based. It is true that in those cases which are described in the Academic Grammar as instances of analytic imperatives the status of *lai* approaches that of a marker of mood, as in this group of uses the verb form itself shows no variation in mood. The only puzzling thing is that the position of *lai* is more similar to that of a sentential particle here. In fact, it is in deontic questions and evaluative contexts that *lai* becomes more similar to a morpheme of mood in that it shows a stronger tendency to merge with the verb form, being placed next to it. But, on the other hand, the interpretation of *lai* as a marker of grammatical mood in these cases would be problematic for other reasons.

First, there is the variation in mood already mentioned. It should be added that, in deontic requests, combinations of *lai* with verb forms are characterised by a twofold modal marking: on the one hand, a deontic predicate is expressed by the particle *lai*, and, on the other hand, the opposition of non-factivity vs. counterfactivity is marked by the mood in which the verb form itself occurs (*ko lai daru* : *ko lai būtu darījis*). Whereas such twofold modal marking is not characteristic of grammatical mood (in the corresponding Latin opposition *quid agam* : *quid agerem* the counterfactive character of the latter is not marked), it is quite possible in verb phrases containing modal verbs, where the modal verb expresses a deontic predicate and can by itself be marked for mood (cf. French *qu’aurais-je dû faire*, German *wässthe ich tun sollen*, where the modal verb is in the preterite subjunctive to mark counterfactivity). And this is not the only feature which the particle *lai* shares with modal verbs. Another interesting fact to be noted here is that verb forms combined with *lai* appear in syntactic contexts normally characterised by assertive modality. Deontic meaning may be conveyed by grammatical mood (as far as deontic requests are concerned cf. Latin *Quid agam? Quid agerem*?), but the capability of combining deontic meaning, or any type of volitive modality, with the formal status of assertion seems to be characteristic of modal verbs (cf. *I think he should come* as against *Let him come*, *May he come*, *Would that he came* etc.). Finally, we might also add that the non-imperative uses of *lai* express an act of volition on the part of some other person than the speaker. Though this feature is not necessarily excluded from the meaning of grammatical mood (cf. the above-mentioned use of the subjunctive in deontic requests in Latin), it is more characteristic of modal verbs. As an example we may cite the Polish verb *mieć* which, as a modal verb,
covers about the same functional domain as the Latvian particle *lai* in its deontic and evaluative uses.

To the three features of the particle *lai* mentioned above as being reminiscent of modal verbs, we may now add the peculiarity with regard to word order which was noted earlier. The fact that *lai*, instead of occupying the position characteristic of sentential particles, appears to enter a close relationship with the verb form, suggests a comparison either with a morpheme of grammatical mood, or with a modal auxiliary. Of course, *lai* is neither of these: ultimately it remains a modal particle. But it is interesting to note that this particle shows as much, if not more, similarities with modal verbs as with morphemes of grammatical mood.

We may thus conclude that, on the one hand, the particle *lai* is used in cases where most other modern languages would use modal verbs, but, on the other, this particle shows some types of grammatical behaviour which tend to be characteristic of modal verbs. This is of particular interest inasmuch as an analogy may be drawn between the case of the particle *lai* and that of the debitive. Though described as a mood in Latvian grammar, the debitive is actually an agglutinative formation behaving in many ways as a combination of a verb with a modal auxiliary (cf. Holvoet 1997). Some peculiarities of constructions with *lai* noted above are also observed in the case of the debitive: it may be marked for several moods (indicative *man ir jāstrādā*, conditional *man būtu jāstrādā*); when used in the indicative, it has assertive value (*vai tu domā, ka man jāstrādā* ‘do you think I should work / have to work’); and it shows internal inflection consisting in the selection of a simple or compound tense stem as a basis for its derivation, as in the case of modal verbs combining with simple or compound infinitives (cf. *kaut kam jānotiek* ‘something must happen’ : *kaut kam jābūt notikušam* ‘something must have happened’ and *kaut kas var notikt* ‘something may happen’ : *kaut kas var būt noticis* ‘something may have happened’). The inventory of verb forms used with *lai* is much more restricted, of course, especially with regard to tense forms, but this is probably connected with the deontic meaning of *lai*: in principle, deontic modals show no differentiation of tense, though reference to the past can be conveyed by the use of a compound infinitive (cf. English *he should come* : *he should have come*). The debitive has a full set of tense forms because it is a ‘root modal’ (or a ‘dynamic modal’ according to Palmer 1986, 102), expressing objective necessity resulting from a certain situation the subject is, was or will be in at a certain moment (cf. English *have to* as against *must* and *should*). It seems, in any case, that both the debitive and the construction with *lai* cover areas of modal meaning which, in most languages, are covered by modal verbs. It is therefore not astonishing that both have some features in common with modal verbs.

As noted above, it seems rather doubtful whether two different functions of *lai* can be distinguished: quasi-inflectional marker of mood in analytic imperatives on
the one hand, and sentential modal particle on the other. Even if a distinction is to be made, such an account of the facts is not corroborated by the actual grammatical behaviour of the particle *lai* in both types of uses. In those cases which have been described as instances of an analytic imperative, *lai* is closest to the status of a sentential particle, whereas in a number of other uses it shows signs of entering a more intimate relation with the verb.

**PAR MODĀLĀS PARTIKULAS LAI FUNKCIJĀM UN GRAMATIKSKO STATUSU**

**Kopsavilkums**

Latviešu valodas gramatikās partikula *lai* parasti tiek minēta tikai kā analītisko imperatīvu formu sastāvdala (*lai nāk, lai neaizmirstam*). Šai rakstā tiek aplūkotā trīs partikulas *lai* lietošanas tipi: (1) teikumos ar pamudinājuma vai vēlējuma nozīmi (*Lai viņi nāk*), (2) deontiskajos jautājumos (*Ko lai es dara? Ko lai es būtu darījis*), un (3) teikumos ar vērtējuma (neaprobēšanas vai šaubu) nozīmi (*Viņš lai būtu pārlīdzējis slepkavam!*). Autors cenšas parādīt, ka pirmā (dažreiz arī otrā) tipa teikumos partikulai *lai* piemēt teikuma partikulas īpašības, kamēr otrā un trešā tipa teikumos iežimējas tendences šai partikulai veidot ar verbu ciešāku sakopojumu, kas gan nelīdzinās analītisko verbu formu statusam, bet zināmā mērā atgādina savienojumus ar modālajiem verbiem. ‘Formveidojošas partikulas’ statusa, ko partikulai *lai* piedevē gramatikā, šim vārdam nav nekur.

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